Executive branch biosecurity policy

Whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate, biological threats require a unified government response. The US executive branch designs and implements programs to prevent, prepare for, and respond to biological threats—from developing vaccines and diagnostic tests to monitoring disease outbreaks, ensuring the safe development of biotechnology, and preparing communities for emergencies. These efforts are shaped by Congress, presidential directives, court decisions, and expert input from organizations outside government, like think tanks.

If you’re looking to explore or advance a career in biosecurity policy, you’ll find opportunities across nearly every executive department and agency. Understanding how these government components work to counter biological threats is essential for choosing where to work and for finding policy opportunities to improve our preparedness. This guide will help you understand the big picture:

What “biosecurity” means and why the definition matters
How different agencies approach biological threats
Which agencies handle prevention, detection, and response
How agencies coordinate on biosecurity initiatives (with real-world examples)
And tips on pursuing executive branch biosecurity careers

Our further reading section includes more in-depth resources, including national strategies and think tank reports, which review US government biosecurity efforts.

This guide provides a broad overview of executive branch biosecurity policy and can help you identify potential agencies of interest. It complements our federal agency profiles, which detail how specific departments and agencies contribute to federal biosecurity initiatives, including relevant offices, recent developments, and guidance on finding jobs in each agency.

Our researching federal agencies guide further explains how you can conduct your own research on agencies and offices aligned with your policy interests.

What is “biosecurity”?

This website offers resources for those interested in biosecurity, which we understand broadly as all efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to biological threats. This field overlaps with several related areas—global health security, biosafety, and biodefense—with different DC communities using these terms in distinct ways that reflect their professional perspectives and priorities—something worth noting when building relationships across government.

In government contexts, key terms to help navigate biosecurity policy discussions include:

Biosecurity focuses on protecting human health, food systems, and ecosystems from biological threats. This includes preventing the spread of harmful organisms (from viruses to invasive species) and stopping the intentional misuse of biological materials.¹
Global health security emphasizes building strong public health systems worldwide to handle disease outbreaks and health emergencies. You’ll often hear this term in international development and diplomatic circles, where the focus is on helping countries work together to stop threats before they spread.
Biosafety centers on laboratory safety practices to prevent accidental exposure to dangerous biological materials. This term is common among lab scientists, safety officers, and regulators who work to protect researchers and their communities.
Biodefense typically refers to protecting against deliberate biological threats like bioterrorism. You’ll hear this most often in national security and defense circles, though some use it more broadly.²

Mapping the federal biosecurity ecosystem

If you’re unsure which department, agency, or office aligns with your interests, focus on understanding how they specialize and fit into big-picture biosecurity work. But also keep in mind that an office’s responsibilities may include less publicly visible or classified work and can shift based on new priorities, funding, and political leadership.

To navigate this complex landscape, it’s helpful to understand the operational dimensions that shape how government agencies approach biosecurity work—ranging from policy development to implementation, domestic to international focus, or crisis response to prevention. Recognizing where an agency or office falls along these dimensions can clarify its role in biosecurity and help you identify agency opportunities matching your skills and interests. The examples below illustrate how some specific agencies and their subdivisions operate along these dimensions, though many work across multiple areas simultaneously. Note that the specific roles and responsibilities in the examples below may change across administrations; focus instead on the differences they illustrate.

Key operational dimensions and agency examples

Policy development vs. program execution: the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in the Department of Commerce shows this split—its Export Administration division writes rules about which sensitive technologies can be exported (like whether specific DNA synthesizers or vaccine production equipment can be sold to other countries), while its Export Enforcement division investigates and blocks companies that try to illegally ship these technologies overseas.
Research and development vs. deployment of ready-to-use technology: the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) both develops new technologies and supports deployment. Its Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) helps create new vaccines and treatments that private companies might not create independently. At the same time, ASPR’s Center for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) ensures that these products—along with other critical supplies like ventilators and emergency medicine—are ready for public emergencies.
Domestic vs. international focus: the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and State split domestic and international biosecurity work. DHS’s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) handles domestic detection and response at major events (e.g. the Super Bowl and presidential inaugurations), while State’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs Office manages international arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

Civilian vs. defense orientation: the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Defense (DOD) support these focus areas through their respective Advanced Research Projects Agencies (ARPAs)—HHS’s ARPA-H advances civilian health technologies, like rapid at-home tests, while DOD’s DARPA develops technologies to protect military personnel, like wearable sensors to detect exposure to biological agents.
Crisis response vs. long-term prevention: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) handles both immediate threats and future preparedness. Its Office of Readiness and Response manages urgent health emergencies like developing emergency response teams during outbreaks, while its Global Health Center works to prevent future crises internationally (e.g. by helping countries build disease testing labs).
Independent operations vs. interagency collaboration: agencies’ level of collaboration varies significantly, partly based on their position in government. Agencies deeper within departments typically operate more independently, while offices closer to the White House typically coordinate more across agencies. The White House Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy (OPPR), for example, coordinates multi-agency efforts like the national response to an emerging disease, while the National Institutes of Health (NIH) within HHS receives independent funding from Congress and conducts or funds research. Many experts we spoke to recommend starting in roles involving interagency coordination to get a broad overview of how different parts of the executive branch work together.³
Intramural research vs. extramural research: the NIH conducts research in high-priority areas like emerging infectious disease both via in-house scientists (“intramural”) and by funding external partners (“extramural”) at universities, medical centers, and other research institutions.
Executive agency vs. independent agency: executive agencies operate under the direct control of Cabinet-level departments and receive close guidance from the White House, aligning closely with the administration’s priorities (e.g. HHS’ Food and Drug Administration). In contrast, independent agencies like the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) function with more autonomy, often with specific statutory mandates that shield them somewhat from political influence, allowing them to make decisions based on scientific, economic, or regulatory criteria without direct White House oversight.

What agencies work on in biosecurity

Building on the operational dimensions above, we can also understand the executive branch’s biosecurity work by considering the core functions of biological threat prevention, detection, and response. Below is a mapping of how different departments and agencies contribute to each area, though many work across multiple domains and this overview may not capture every agency’s complex and multifaceted contributions. Our agency profiles (linked throughout this section) provide more in-depth information on the subagencies and offices contributing to these topics.

Mapping executive agencies to biosecurity topics

Prevention – stopping biological threats before they occur:
- Creating national biosecurity and pandemic preparedness strategies — Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy (OPPR), National Security Council (NSC), Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
- Setting and enforcing biosafety and biosecurity guidelines for laboratories and/or agricultural operations — CDC, NIH, Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- Managing export controls for dual-use technologies and compliance with international nonproliferation agreements — BIS, DOD, State, Intelligence Community
- Engaging in global biosecurity partnerships and agreements; providing capacity-building assistance to other countries — State, CDC, DOD
- Strengthening public health infrastructure to withstand biological threats and improve hospital readiness — HHS, CDC, ASPR, Department of Veterans Affairs
- Regulating new biotechnology applications (including dual-use technologies) or developing standards for biological measurement and biotechnology — FDA, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Executive Office of the President (EOP)
- Strengthening defenses against cross-border movement of biological threats including through the Federal Select Agent Program — DHS, USDA, CDC
- Preventing zoonotic diseases, securing the food supply chain, and managing invasive species risks — USDA, CDC, FDA, Department of the Interior (DOI)
Detection – monitoring systems and risk assessments to identify threats:
- Establishing and maintaining disease surveillance and early warning systems — DHS, CDC, DOD
- Implementing animal disease surveillance — USDA, CDC, DOI
- Conducting risk assessments and developing detailed computational models (e.g. epidemiological simulations, predictive analytics, and threat scenario modeling) to predict, detect, and respond to biological threats — DHS, DOD, CDC, Department of Energy (DOE), ASPR
Response – (preparing for) immediate action to mitigate the impact once a threat has materialized:
- Coordinating interagency efforts in times of crisis response — NSC, OSTP, OPPR
- Expediting approvals and authorizations for medical countermeasures (MCM) like vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics during emergencies — FDA
- Supporting disaster response and recovery efforts by mobilizing resources, coordinating with state and local partners, and providing logistical support for the deployment of MCM and emergency resources — Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), ASPR
- Safeguarding military personnel, maintaining biosecurity readiness in the military — DOD
- Coordinating and providing resources for federal emergency response and preparedness for biological incidents — DHS, HHS, ASPR, CDC, DOD, State, US Agency for International Development (USAID)
- Managing the Strategic National Stockpile, including prioritizing MCM procurement and ensuring they are ready to be deployed — ASPR, HHS, DHS
- Supporting early-stage MCM research and development — HHS, ASPR, NIH, DOE, ARPA-H, BARDA, DOD

COVID-19 vaccines as a case study in government coordination

The rapid development and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines is one of the most compelling illustrations of coordinated government biosecurity efforts. This historic collaboration underscores the importance of each agency leveraging its unique authorities, resources, and capabilities across the different operational dimensions and functions discussed above.

Major government initiatives typically involve many agencies, making it valuable to understand their roles, responsibilities, cultures, and potential conflicts. Some agencies generally have more influence over specific policy issues—for instance, while many agencies contributed to COVID-19 vaccine development and distribution, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had the final authority to approve vaccines.

Agencies involved in COVID-19 vaccine development and distribution

Phase 1: Laying the research foundation
The US government in the decade before the pandemic set the stage for the US to successfully and quickly develop an effective vaccine. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began funding mRNA vaccine research in 2012 through its ADEPT: PROTECT program, developing nucleic acid-based vaccines. This early work enabled Moderna to test an mRNA vaccine in clinical trials by 2019, just months before the pandemic. Similarly, BARDA within HHS had been researching coronaviruses for over fifteen years, developing expertise and resources that would prove instrumental during the pandemic.

Phase 2: Operation Warp Speed (OWS) and accelerated development
Operation Warp Speed (OWS) launched in May 2020 with $10 billion in CARES Act funding to address the COVID-19 crisis. This joint DOD-HHS initiative coordinated vaccine development, manufacturing, and distribution. White House oversight provided strategic direction and agency alignment, enabling rapid decisions and resource allocation to compress vaccine development and deployment from the typical multi-year timeline to just months. BARDA led the development of seven vaccine candidates by funding research, expanding manufacturing capacity, and securing advance purchase agreements. It also served as the primary liaison between the government and the biomedical industry, particularly in developing the Moderna mRNA vaccine. Partnerships with private companies ensured the efficient mobilization of resources, advanced production capabilities, and the delivery of lifesaving technologies. Other agencies provided crucial support throughout: for example, USDA assisted with supply chains, while DOE supported production efforts.

Phase 3: Regulatory approval and distribution
Once FDA granted emergency use authorization for the first COVID-19 vaccine, agencies turned to distribution. FEMA spearheaded domestic vaccine logistics, managing facilities and equipment, providing personal protective equipment (PPE) and training, and establishing vaccine registration systems. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) managed international vaccine distribution, helping deliver hundreds of millions of doses to 116 countries. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and CDC also provided resources to ensure vaccines reached communities across the US.

Lessons learned: keys to effective biosecurity coordination
The coordinated effort behind COVID-19 vaccine development and distribution demonstrates the impact of early investment, interagency collaboration, and public-private partnerships. DARPA and BARDA’s long-term research provided a strong foundation for the rapid vaccine response. OWS demonstrated how over 10 federal agencies and Congress, alongside pharmaceutical companies and research institutions, leveraged their distinct capabilities to accelerate development and distribution. This case illustrates how biosecurity priorities often rely on complex networks of agencies and partners, making it essential to identify the roles played by different agencies and who is best positioned to achieve specific goals.

Navigating executive branch biosecurity careers

As this guide shows, biosecurity work in the executive branch offers diverse career opportunities, from strategy development to research to emergency response. Encompassing hundreds of distinct agencies, the executive branch collectively employs millions of people and offers job opportunities year-round—including many relevant to biosecurity.

To complement this general overview of executive branch biosecurity policy work, explore our agency profiles for deeper dives into the office structures, recent biosecurity initiatives, and employment pathways at specific agencies. Our researching federal agencies guide further explains how you can conduct your own research on agencies and offices aligned with your policy interests.

Understanding the basics of federal employment is essential for pursuing agency roles. Our federal agency application advice includes resources on interviewing for federal positions, understanding USAJOBS.gov (the official website for federal jobs), and federal resume advice. Positions relevant to national security also generally require a security clearance, which can take months or more than a year.

Our guide on building professional networks in DC and our bio policy resources list can also support your journey into bio policy work. For entry pathways, virtually all agencies involved in bio policy offer internships, and many provide fellowship opportunities for early- to mid-career individuals.

Here are some key takeaways if you’d like to work in this space:

Different agencies approach biosecurity in distinct ways. Some focus on policy development while others handle day-to-day operations; some work domestically while others engage internationally; some concentrate on prevention while others specialize in response. The scope of work is remarkably diverse, encompassing research, analysis, coordination, project management, communications, software development, and more. Consider which of these approaches align best with your skills and interests.
There are opportunities for people from diverse backgrounds to contribute meaningfully to biosecurity. While medical or life science experience can be valuable and may be required for certain roles, many positions need expertise in areas like policy analysis, law, economics, ethics, or communications. Your background—whether in financial analysis, communications, or data science—can be valuable in developing and implementing biosecurity policy.
- What’s more, agency staffers often have experience working in Congress and organizations outside government like think tanks, and many move between these different institutions throughout their careers. This career mobility allows you to build relevant experience, networks, and expertise from multiple angles.
- So, when you’re just starting out, don’t restrict your search just to agency opportunities with “biosecurity” in the title—you should cast a wide net across different policy areas and institutions. For example, you can look for biosecurity-adjacent positions in think tanks or Congress related to public health, science or technology policy, international diplomacy, or national security. Getting your first position is often the hardest, but fortunately (given the highly transferable knowledge and skills), you can typically move laterally between policy roles regardless of where you begin your career.
Each agency controls different policy levers for biosecurity. For example, if you’re passionate about the safe conduct of life sciences research, you might focus on agencies that regulate laboratory safety (CDC), fund and oversee research grants (NIH), or engage internationally on research oversight (State). Offices with strong coordination roles—typically in or near the White House—can provide particularly valuable overviews of how different parts of government work together to achieve cross-cutting initiatives.

Appendix: A brief history of biosecurity policy

US government biosecurity efforts have a long history that is hard to do justice to in this article, but here is a short overview of key historical developments:

Brief history of biosecurity policy and executive branch organization

The US’ modern history with biosecurity traces back to early efforts to prevent the spread of cholera and other infectious diseases in the late 19th century. The US became part of the World Health Assembly when the World Health Organization, as we know it today, was established in the 1940s as part of the post-World War II United Nations architecture. By 1969, the US became a party to the International Health Regulations (IHR), a treaty initially designed to control six diseases—cholera, plague, yellow fever, smallpox, relapsing fever, and typhus—through quarantine measures and international travel regulations.

Around this same time, the United States ended its offensive biological weapons program, which had been set up during WWII (the former Soviet Union and Japan also had offensive biological weapons programs then). President Nixon unilaterally announced the destruction of the nation’s biological weapons stockpile in 1969 and committed to restricting future efforts to defensive research only. Following this decision, the US became a leading advocate for an international ban on biological weapons, helping drive the creation of the Biological Weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1975.

Through today, the DOD continues biodefense research to protect military personnel, and HHS continues public health research to combat infectious diseases—including the AIDS epidemic of the 80s and 90s—and it established regulations for transferring select agents that pose severe public health risks.

The anthrax attacks in 2001 elevated biosecurity to a top national priority, helping motivate many new agency biosecurity programs in the 2000s:

DHS was created in 2002, consolidating several existing agencies and efforts to better address terrorist threats, including biological attacks.
DOE developed the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS), which later became DHS’ BioWatch program to detect airborne pathogens.
In 2004, Congress enacted Project BioShield, dedicating $5.6 billion to accelerate medical countermeasures (MCM) against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. Under this law, DHS must issue a Material Threat Determination for a pathogen before ASPR can use BioShield funds to develop or procure MCM for it.
In 2005, the IHR underwent major revisions that expanded its scope to address any public health emergency of international concern.
State launched the Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP) in 2006 to enhance global biosecurity by securing dangerous pathogens and improving disease surveillance.
HHS strengthened the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) with facility registration, personnel risk assessments, and inventory controls.
HHS also created the original ASPR (“Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response”) to coordinate federal responses to health emergencies, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) initiated the Public Health Emergency Preparedness program to strengthen state and local capabilities.
USDA focused on agricultural biosecurity, implementing measures to protect the nation’s food supply from threats like Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (“mad cow disease”) that can harm consumers, and collaborating internationally to prevent the spread of zoonotic diseases.

Biosecurity efforts continued in the 2010s, often tied to major outbreaks. CDC led responses to the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009 and the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, while NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) continued funding fundamental research in vaccines and antivirals. In 2013, the US worked with partners to launch the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)—which emphasizes biosafety and biosecurity—to accelerate global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats and to achieve the IHR requirements, which the majority of countries were unable to meet by the 2012 deadline established during the IHR revisions in 2005. This led to the development and implementation of a new international regime of voluntary peer review for biopreparedness called the Joint External Evaluations (JEE). Due to the GHSA and the West African Ebola epidemic, US budgets for global health security increased meaningfully during this timeframe.

When COVID-19 emerged in 2020, the executive branch mobilized its resources across key agencies to respond. HHS coordinated the national response, spearheading Operation Warp Speed alongside DOD to fast-track vaccine development and distribution (see case study above for further detail). CDC issued public health guidance and managed disease surveillance, while FDA expedited access to tests, treatments, and vaccines through Emergency Use Authorizations. DOD provided logistical support, deploying medical personnel, setting up field hospitals, and aiding in vaccine distribution. DOE leveraged its national labs to model the virus’s spread and assist in developing diagnostics and treatments. State worked to repatriate Americans abroad and supported global vaccination efforts, and Commerce deployed $1.5 billion in economic recovery aid.

In 2021, the White House released National Security Memorandum-1 as a US plan of action to promote national and global health security and biodefense, re-establishing the National Security Council Directorate focused on these issues and calling for a renewed focus. The White House also released the American Pandemic Preparedness Plan to establish a roadmap for strengthening public health infrastructure, accelerating MCMs, and enhancing early threat detection. The passage of the American Rescue Plan Act in 2021 also heralded another significant boost in US global health security budgets. The 2022 National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan built on this, establishing a strategic framework for coordinating biosecurity efforts across federal agencies.

During this timeframe, the White House also championed the establishment of a new Pandemic Fund, which was recommended after the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic, including by the 2021 G20 High-Level Independent Panel and International Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response. In 2022, Congress launched the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health (ARPA-H) to accelerate biomedical innovations, and HHS elevated ASPR from a staff division to an operating division, expanding its autonomy and responsibilities. Congress also codified US coordination roles for health security and established a presidentially-appointed Global Health Security Coordinator and authorized US support for the Pandemic Fund as part of the US Global Health Security and International Pandemic Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Act, which was included in the National Defense Authorization Act. In 2023, the PREVENT Pandemics Act established the White House Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy (OPPR) to ensure sustained oversight of pandemic readiness across federal agencies. President Biden also issued an Executive Order on AI, which included a focus on biosecurity risks emerging from AI.