Overview

Export controls are regulations that restrict which goods, technologies, and services can be sold or transferred to foreign countries, entities, or individuals. The US government primarily uses export controls to protect national security by limiting access to the most sensitive US technologies and weapons. More than a dozen federal agencies administer export controls across a vast range of goods and technologies, including advanced semiconductors, conventional weapons, and nuclear materials.

Export controls have long been a core tool of US national security policy and have recently attracted particular attention in the context of emerging technologies. Since October 2022, the US has enacted multiple rounds of controls affecting global access to AI-related technologies, from semiconductor manufacturing equipment to AI chips. The US has also recently expanded bio-related controls—which cover pathogens, toxins, and related—to include items such as nucleic acid synthesis software with potential biological weapons applications.

This guide explains the reasons and mechanisms for export controls, outlines the key institutions and processes, and discusses considerations and opportunities for working on export controls.

Why does the government use export controls? 

Export controls generally serve one or more of these primary policy goals¹:

1. Preventing adversaries from acquiring sensitive goods: The US restricts the flow of conventional weapons, nuclear materials, dual-use technologies, and technical knowledge to hostile actors—including designated countries of concern and non-state actors like terrorist organizations—often in coordination with allies through multilateral export control regimes.
2. Preserving strategic advantages: Beyond denying specific dangerous capabilities, export controls can aim to maintain broader advantages over strategic competitors by restricting their access to advanced technologies. This rationale has become increasingly prominent in recent years.

Export control basics 

Export controls can be categorized by what gets controlled, who can receive controlled items, and what they can be used for. Controls can apply to both tangible exports (physical goods) and intangible transfers like software, services, and technical know-how.²

Controls vary in breadth. Comprehensive embargoes—typically imposed through sanctions programs³—restrict nearly all exports to certain countries, such as North Korea, Cuba, or Iran. Selective controls, which comprise the majority of export controls and are the focus of this guide, restrict only certain items or technologies to specific actors.

What gets controlled

The US controls three main types of exports:

• Dual-use items are goods that can be applied for both civilian and military purposes (e.g. software, semiconductors, biotech). These comprise most US export control activity, and their control falls under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), administered by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).
• Munitions (e.g. weapons, satellites, spacecraft, and defense services) are controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) under the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC).
• Nuclear technologies are controlled primarily by the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). NNSA oversees the transfer of nuclear technologies abroad, including reactor design, enrichment technologies, and related services. NRC maintains licensing authority for exports of reactors and nuclear-grade materials.⁴

These agencies and their roles are covered in more depth below.

How controls work

For each controlled item, the US may set restrictions or conditions based on where it is going, who will receive it, and how it will be used:

• List-based controls define explicit parameters for what items may require an export license. These controls apply nationwide to one or more countries and have a licensing policy depending on the reason for control. For some destinations, exporters may be required to obtain a license, which agencies review to determine whether the export should be allowed and under what conditions.
• End-use controls restrict exports based on how items might be used. These controls are designed to prevent items from supporting adversaries’ activities like chemical and biological weapons development, nuclear weapons programs, or other restricted military applications. Even when an item and destination might otherwise be permissible, exports can be blocked if there’s evidence the item will support a prohibited end use.
• End-user controls restrict exports to specific persons or entities identified as posing national security or foreign policy risks. For example, BIS’s Entity List designates foreign entities to which exports require a license, often with a presumption of denial. The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers related restrictions through sanctions programs, which can also prohibit transactions with specific designated parties.

BIS also has the authority to write “is-informed letters”—a flexible tool that allows BIS to impose a license requirement on specific exports or activities subject to US jurisdiction. Because these letters are non-public and do not require the same interagency review process as updates to list-based or end-use/end-user controls, they allow BIS to act quickly on targeted transactions.

Controls beyond US borders

US export control jurisdiction extends beyond direct exports from the US. Several mechanisms extend US authority to transactions that occur entirely abroad:

• De minimis rules extend US jurisdiction to certain foreign-produced items that contain a specified amount of US content.
• Foreign Direct Product Rules (FDPRs) extend US jurisdiction to certain products manufactured abroad using US goods, software, or technologies. This allows BIS controls to apply in scenarios like advanced semiconductors made in Taiwan using American equipment and intellectual property.
• Re-export controls require authorization when a controlled item that has already left the United States is transferred onward to a third country, or when a foreign-made product incorporating US-origin items above certain thresholds is exported to a restricted destination (e.g. a country purchasing US defense equipment cannot resell it to another nation without US approval).
• In-country transfer controls require authorization when a controlled item remains in the same country but is transferred to a different end user, since the original export license is typically tied to a specific recipient and intended use.
• US person controls restrict the activities of US citizens and permanent residents regardless of where they are located. For example, a US engineer working abroad could be prohibited from providing technical assistance to a foreign government’s weapons program, even if the work occurs entirely outside the United States.

Unilateral and multilateral controls

The US enacts export controls both unilaterally (independently) and multilaterally (with other countries). Unilateral controls typically cover items or supply chains for which the US dominates market share. Multilateral controls are coordinated between the US and other states primarily through four major regimes⁶: 

• The Wassenaar Arrangement (1996) coordinates controls on conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies among 42 participating states, with an emphasis on transparency among member states.⁷
• The Missile Technology Control Regime (1987) covers 35 states seeking to limit the spread of missiles, drones, and delivery systems for nuclear weapons.
• The Australia Group (1985) includes 43 states aiming to limit chemical and biological weapons proliferation.
• The Nuclear Suppliers Group (1974) coordinates 48 states in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation.

Export controls and emerging technology 

In recent years, the US has enacted multiple landmark controls aimed at restricting access to advanced technologies, most prominently advanced semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

AI-related export controls have attracted particular attention because of the unusual structure of the AI compute supply chain. Training and deploying frontier AI systems requires enormous computing power provided by specialized AI chips, and the supply chain that produces these chips has chokepoints that are largely dominated by the US and its allies. This concentration means that restricting access at one stage of the supply chain can in principle constrain downstream AI capabilities. The accordion below explains this supply chain and its relevance to export controls in more detail.

The AI compute supply chain and why it matters for export controls

Training a single frontier AI model can cost hundreds of millions of dollars in compute alone, and the infrastructure needed to support it requires substantial capital investment. This is why AI chips and the supply chain that produces them have become the central focus of AI-related export controls.

The supply chain for AI chips involves several steps: design (where companies architect chip designs), fabrication (where foundries manufacture chips), and assembly, testing, and packaging (where firms prepare finished chips for use). Fabrication requires highly specialized semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) built by a small number of firms. These chips then flow through system integrators into data centers operated by cloud providers and AI companies, where they deliver the computing power used to develop and deploy AI systems.

What makes this supply chain unusual is its extreme concentration. A handful of firms dominate each chokepoint: Nvidia (American) designs the dominant share of AI chips; ASML (Dutch) is the sole supplier of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines required for the most advanced fabrication; and TSMC (Taiwanese) manufactures roughly 90% of the world’s most advanced chips. The US and its close allies control these chokepoints, giving them significant leverage. Restricting access at any single stage by limiting exports of chips or manufacturing equipment can constrain downstream AI capabilities.

Compared to other key inputs to AI development, compute has several properties that are uniquely governable. Unlike training data and algorithms, which are non-rivalrous, easily copied, and difficult to track, computing hardware is a physical good that is: 

• detectable (large AI data centers consume hundreds of megawatts of power and are visible via satellite), 
• excludable (access can be restricted at the point of sale or export)⁸, and 
• quantifiable (chip performance can be measured in operations per second and other technical parameters). 

These properties help explain why recent export controls have targeted computing hardware rather than AI software or algorithms directly, and why such controls can define their scope using measurable technical thresholds like chip processing speed.

As the diagram above illustrates, US controls can target multiple points along this supply chain: restricting exports of advanced AI chips, limiting access to the semiconductor manufacturing equipment needed to produce them, and restricting transfers of certain AI model weights. These and other developments are covered in the timelines below.

Why (not) work on export controls? 

The case for impact

• Geopolitical influence: US export controls affect the development and use of technologies globally. Given America’s technological dominance and broad extraterritorial jurisdiction, US export controls are a leveraged tool for shaping the technological trajectories of foreign actors and their relations with the US.
• Responsiveness and flexibility: Regulatory updates and licensing decisions take place in the executive branch, allowing continuous policy refinement without new legislation. The White House and certain agencies have significant authority over export controls, making them one of the few tools the US can rapidly employ to respond to fast-emerging technological and geopolitical shifts.
• Technical specifications that shape broader AI governance: Many proposed domestic AI regulations reference specific export control definitions and technical thresholds (e.g. the compute thresholds used in chip classification). Getting these specifications right in the export control context can have spillover effects across AI governance, as the same metrics and definitions can be adopted in other policy domains.
• Size relative to mandate: BIS (the primary agency administering US export controls) operates with relatively modest resources: ~530 staff and a ~$330 million budget to administer controls over a vast range of goods, software, and technology in global commerce, including some of the most consequential emerging technologies.

The case for professional growth

• Interdisciplinary vantage point: Export controls require a combination of expertise on technology for setting control parameters, law for drafting rules, economics for understanding the impact on supply chains, and geopolitics for understanding which technologies will be important. For AI-related controls, for instance, the work requires understanding which chips matter, how models are trained, and the structure of the semiconductor supply chain.
• Proximity to major decisions: Agency specialists often draft and evaluate export controls directly, putting them close to high-stakes decisions on the flow of US technology that directly impact billion-dollar industries and sectors critical to national security.
• Interagency experience: Export control work spans Commerce, State, Defense, Treasury, and the intelligence community, providing cross-agency exposure that translates well to broader national security and technology policy roles.
• Supply chain visibility and situational awareness: Working on AI-relevant export controls provides unusual insight into where chips are produced, deployed, and who is using them. This visibility into compute infrastructure (e.g. chip inventories, data center locations, and the capabilities they enable) is directly applicable to assessing AI company capabilities, projecting what models can be produced, and informing broader technology governance discussions.
• Diplomatic experience: The US often coordinates export controls with other countries either through direct negotiation and multilateral agreements, so working on export controls can provide first-hand experience in diplomacy and multilateral cooperation. 

Factors limiting the effectiveness of some export controls

• Enforcement challenges: Detecting illicit exports or end-use violations can be difficult, especially when buyers use intermediaries or shell companies to disguise transactions. Multiple investigations have documented chip smuggling to China, though both the scale of smuggling and its significance for Chinese AI capabilities remain contested. BIS has ~11 Export Control Officers posted globally to monitor compliance with US export rules.
• Pace of policy change: As noted above, the concentration of export control authority in the executive branch means policies can shift significantly between or even within administrations. This enables flexible, timely response to developments but also means that controls you work on may be rapidly revised or replaced as priorities change. 
• Diplomatic relationships: Many supply chains span multiple countries, which creates diplomatic tradeoffs when relevant items are made in other countries. The US can control these items unilaterally through the Foreign Direct Product Rule—which applies US controls to items made abroad using US technology. Some countries view this as a violation of their sovereignty. Another option is coordinating export controls with other nations. These negotiations preserve diplomatic capital and leverage other countries’ enforcement capabilities, but may also delay implementation or result in weaker controls. 
• Economic costs for US companies: Export controls prevent American firms from selling to restricted foreign buyers, which can hurt their revenue. This tension is acute in semiconductors and chipmaking equipment, where China represents a major market. Companies have argued that lost sales weaken their ability to fund research and development, potentially undermining the technological advantages that controls aim to protect.
• Limited domestic application: Export controls primarily restrict what can be sent abroad, which means they do not directly address policy concerns related to how AI is developed or deployed within the US.
• Diminishing effectiveness over time for a given capability level: As algorithms improve and hardware efficiency increases, the amount of compute required to achieve any given AI capability tends to decrease. This means that compute-based controls become less effective over time at restricting access to a specific capability level, as the targets become less detectable and harder to exclude. This dynamic means export controls may need continuous updating to remain effective and may not be a durable solution for some categories of risk.

The export controls process: Who’s involved? 

The following sections cover key actors at each stage of the export control policymaking process. While the process details vary by administration, broadly export control policymaking happens through these five stages: 

1. Strategy and agenda-setting: The presidential administration determines export control priorities as part of its national security strategy. Key players include Presidential advisors, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). Congress also has oversight of the relevant export control agencies, and is increasingly proposing legislation to more directly influence export controls. 
2. Developing controls: Federal agencies translate high-level strategy into specific export restrictions. For dual-use export controls, the Department of Commerce (BIS) has the regulatory authority and in many cases will develop the technical language and parameters, but regulations need to be approved by the Departments of State (DDTC), Energy (NNSA), and Defense (DTSA). Other agencies may be able to review if they have equities, including Treasury (OFAC).
3. License review: Agencies review applications from exporters seeking permission to export controlled items. The Departments of Commerce, State, Energy, and Defense will typically be entitled to review the applications, though the departments may delegate their authority to review to another agency, if the license is not relevant to their equities.
4. Enforcement: Agencies implement controls through licensing systems, compliance monitoring, and enforcement actions. Key actors include the analysts and agents in BIS Export Enforcement (EE), who investigate violations and conduct end-use checks, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), which prosecutes criminal cases. The intelligence community also supports enforcement by producing information such as leads that trigger end-use checks of exported products.
5. Oversight: Congress, Inspectors General, and external groups monitor export control effectiveness, identify gaps in enforcement, and evaluate whether controls achieve their intended national security goals.

Strategy and agenda-setting

Congress has delegated extensive power to the executive branch to impose, modify, and remove controls without new legislation.¹¹ As a result, the White House and federal agencies play a central role in setting priorities and balancing tradeoffs between national security and economic impact. Congress retains a role through authorizing legislation, oversight, and funding. The executive branch may also coordinate with allies and multilateral regimes to align policy goals.

Regulatory development, license review, and enforcement

Typically, multiple agencies are involved in export controls, from drafting regulations to reviewing license applications to enforcing restrictions. The table below shows the lead agency for each jurisdiction; the sections below give more detail on each stage. The Department of Justice (DOJ) handles criminal prosecution across all export control regimes, often supported by the FBI.

Developing controls

Export controls are typically published in regulations, and creating or updating them follows a rulemaking process similar to other federal regulations (for more on rulemaking, see our regulatory policy guide). But export control rulemaking has several unique features, including:

1. BIS and other export control agencies frequently use interim final rules—regulations that take effect immediately while still soliciting public comments afterward. This “regulate first, collect comments later” approach differs from the standard notice-and-comment process used in most federal rulemaking, where agencies publish a proposed rule and gather feedback before it takes effect. Agencies justify this approach on national security grounds: publishing proposed controls in advance could prompt adversaries to stockpile restricted items or restructure transactions to circumvent controls before they take effect.
2. Technical Advisory Committees (TACs) composed of industry and government experts provide BIS with recommendations on technical parameters for export controls and help identify technologies that may warrant controls. BIS established the Emerging Technology Technical Advisory Committee (ETTAC) in 2018 to support its work identifying critical emerging and foundational technologies under ECRA. The involvement of the TACs varies by administration.

Beyond controlling specific items, agencies also periodically make structural changes to the export control system itself—such as creating new screening lists, expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction, or aligning BIS practices with other agencies’ standards. Recent examples include the creation of the Military End-User List (2020), the Affiliates Rule (2025), and repeated expansions of the Foreign Direct Product Rule.

License review

Exporters seeking to send controlled items to restricted destinations or end users must apply for a license, which agencies review to determine whether the export should be allowed.

The process below focuses on BIS, which handles the largest volume of license applications. Other export control agencies (DDTC, NNSA, NRC, and OFAC) follow broadly similar procedures for items under their jurisdictions.

For dual-use items, BIS receives and processes license applications. On paper, the process is that within 9 days, BIS should decide whether to refer the application to other agencies, typically one or more agencies from the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, for review.¹⁴ BIS is supposed to aim to reach a licensing decision within 30 days, though complex cases can take significantly longer.

When agencies disagree, a structured escalation process allows disputes to be elevated through increasingly senior interagency bodies—from the Operating Committee, to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy, to the Export Administration Review Board—and ultimately to the President. A license application is supposed to be resolved or appealed to the President within 90 days, though the order does not place a time limit on a presidential decision (see figure below).

Enforcement

Enforcement of export controls involves monitoring compliance and investigating and penalizing violations. The lead enforcement agency depends on the item’s jurisdiction (see the table above), but several agencies play cross-cutting enforcement roles:

• Department of Homeland Security (DHS): Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) has broad statutory authority to investigate export control violations across all regimes and leads the interagency Export Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C2); Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens and seizes shipments at ports.
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): Leads counterintelligence and technology transfer investigations with national security implications.
• Department of Justice (DOJ): The National Security Division prosecutes criminal violations of EAR, ITAR, IEEPA, and sanctions laws. In 2023, DOJ and BIS jointly launched the Disruptive Technology Strike Force to coordinate investigations targeting illicit technology transfers to adversaries.

Enforcement tools range from administrative actions (e.g. warning letters, compliance agreements) through civil penalties (e.g. fines, denial of export privileges) to criminal prosecution (potentially resulting in imprisonment and substantial fines). BIS also encourages voluntary self-disclosures, where exporters who discover their own violations report them to BIS, typically resulting in significantly reduced penalties. BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) also conducts end-use checks—pre- and post-shipment inspections to verify that exported items reach their intended recipients and are used as authorized. BIS’s Office of Enforcement Analysis (OEA) will also study a wide range of sources including export data to produce leads for enforcement actions.

Oversight 

Multiple institutions monitor export control policy to ensure effectiveness, accountability, and alignment with national security objectives:

• The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) exercises significant influence over export control programs through the federal budget. By adjusting agency funding levels—including staffing, enforcement resources, and technology investments—OMB can shape the scale and priorities of export control activities.
• Congress exercises oversight through hearings, reporting requirements, and investigations. Congressional committees with jurisdiction over export controls organize hearings on control effectiveness, licensing patterns, and enforcement gaps. Congress also requires agencies to submit reports on license applications, denials, and enforcement actions (e.g. ECRA mandates regular reporting on emerging technology controls and their implementation). In December 2024, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations released a report on semiconductor diversion to China, finding that BIS failed to prevent thousands of advanced semiconductors from reaching Chinese military and intelligence agencies through inadequate enforcement and third-country transshipment.
  • Congress’ Government Accountability Office (GAO) also conducts independent audits of export control programs to assess their efficacy and recommend improvements.¹⁵ 

• Inspectors General operate within each agency to investigate waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement. The Commerce IG audits BIS operations, while the State IG reviews DDTC programs. Their reports can uncover compliance issues or procedural weaknesses in how agencies implement controls.
• External groups, including think tanks, industry associations, and civil society organizations, evaluate export control effectiveness by tracking enforcement patterns, analyzing regulatory impacts, and highlighting unintended consequences. These assessments often inform congressional oversight and shape public understanding.

Working on export controls: types of roles and career opportunities

Preparing for export control work

While requisite skills and experience vary widely across export control roles (e.g. control drafting vs. enforcement), two qualifications stand out as broadly valuable: subject-matter expertise and policy analysis experience. To build these and prepare for export control roles, consider:

• Complete an S&T policy internship or fellowship: Internships or fellowships at BIS or other export control agencies, congressional committees with export control jurisdiction, or think tanks focused on trade and technology policy can provide direct exposure to the field. See opportunities for specific agencies and organizations linked above.
• Gain subject-matter expertise: Many export control roles expect strong technical depth in the relevant field—whether it be biotech, AI, or nuclear technologies. Graduate degrees in STEM fields are often expected or a significant advantage in such roles. Policy fellowships in such fields are also helpful to build relevant technical expertise. 
• Publish research or policy articles: Demonstrate technical credibility through peer-reviewed publications, conference talks, or patents. If you’re a student or early-career, consider co-authoring research with a professor or publishing a science policy article in a relevant outlet.
• Network with relevant professionals: Reach out to current and former staff at your institutions of interest for informational interviews. These conversations can help you navigate the hiring process, clarify your fit, and gain valuable professional connections. If you’re able, consider attending events hosted by think tanks on relevant topics to connect with professionals in the space and deepen your subject-matter knowledge. 
• Follow export control developments: Subscribe to newsletters and alerts tracking export control activity (e.g. BIS press releases). Commercial law firms often provide detailed, apolitical breakdowns of new rules and their implications.
• Participate in public comment periods: Submitting comments on proposed or interim final export control rules helps you engage directly with the rulemaking process and build familiarity with how controls are developed. You can find open comment periods on Regulations.gov.
• Understand the export control legal framework: Familiarize yourself with key authorities like ECRA, ITAR, and IEEPA, and the basics of how control lists, licensing, and enforcement work (see resources below). Some law schools and policy programs offer courses on export controls or trade law.

Appendices: Brief history of export controls

Further reading

• Bureau of Industry and Security news, BIS
• Federal Register, BIS
• US Export Controls and China: Advanced Semiconductors, Congressional Research Service (2025)
• Export Controls Are a Defining Instrument of US National Security, Center for New American Security (2025)
• Promoting the Export of the US AI Technology Stack, The White House (2025) 
• Export Controls: The Perennial Debate Continues, Center for Strategic & International Studies (2025)
• Advances in AI and Increased Biological Risks: Responsibly Deploying Export Controls as Part of the Solution, Council on Strategic Risks (2024)
• The tension between AI export control and US AI innovation, Brookings (2024)
• Computing Power and the Governance of AI, Girish Sastry, Lennart Heim, et. al., 2024
• Export Controls—International Coordination: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (2023)
• Optimizing Export Controls for Critical and Emerging Technologies: Semiconductors, Quantum Technology, AI, and Biotechnology, Center for Strategic & International Studies (2023)
• The U.S. Export Control System and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Congressional Research Service (2021)

Footnotes